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I. Introduction
Modern-day professional athletes have the ability to earn
extremely high annual salaries. With the average Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) and National Basketball Association (“NBA”)
franchises being valued at over one-and-a-half billion dollars1,
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LAW REVIEW. Philippians 4:13. Mr. Vignola would like to thank his family and
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offer special thanks to Professor Linda Fentiman, the faculty advisor who
supervised the writing of this Article.
1 Kurt Badenhausen, NBA Team Values 2018: Every Club Now Worth at
Least
$1
Billion,
Forbes
(Feb.
7,
2018,
9:57
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2018/02/07/nba-team-values2018-every-club-now-worth-at-least-1-billion/#7643eb771558; Mike Ozanian,
Baseball Team Values 2018, Forbes (Apr. 11, 2018, 9:55 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2018/04/11/baseball-team-values2018/#7e404a6c3fc0.
*
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the average National Football League (“NFL”) franchise being
valued at over two-and-a-half billion dollars2, and the average
National Hockey League (“NHL”) franchise being valued at
almost six hundred million dollars3, there are ample funds from
which the professional sports franchises can pay their athletes.
As such, a professional athlete is normally able to negotiate a
multi-million dollar salary with the professional franchise that
owns the player’s playing rights. In many situations, after a
player signs a contract with the franchise, the two sides proceed
without incident: the player performs under the contract to its
term, and the team pays the player pursuant to the contract.
However, circumstances sometimes arise in which either
the player believes the contract he signed with the franchise no
longer reflects the salary to which he believes he is entitled; the
player wishes to extend the term of the contract; or the player
no longer wishes to play for the franchise which retains the
player’s playing rights.4 When a player feels this way, the player
usually refuses to play his respective sport under the terms of
the original contract in the hope that he can gain the new terms
he desires by “holding out.” 5 Because the players who take such
action are important to their team,6 the franchise often has no
choice but to acquiesce to the new contract terms7 or to make an
unwanted trade of the player.8
2
Forbes Staff Leadership, Forbes Releases 21st Annual NFL Team
Valuations,
FORBES
(Sept.
20,
2018,
11:48
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2018/09/20/forbes-releases-21st-annualnfl-team-valuations/#6db0103f7af4.
3 Mike Ozanian, The NHL’s Most Valuable Teams 2017, FORBES (Dec. 5,
2017, 9:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2017/12/05/thenhls-most-valuable-teams-4/#593db34017c7.
4 See Basil M. Loeb, Deterring Player Holdouts: Who Should Do It, How
to Do It, and Why It Has to Be Done, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275, 275 (2001).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 276.
7 Id. at 277.
8
See ESPN, Jimmy Butler Demand Led to ‘Negative Environment,’
Wolves’
Owner
Says,
ESPN
(Nov.
18,
2018),
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25283567/glen-taylor-minnesotatimberwolves-owner-addresses-trade-jimmy-butler-philadelphia-76ers
(reporting on Minnesota Timberwolves former star player Jimmy Butler, who
stated he would no longer play for the Timberwolves—even after the
Timberwolves owner attempted to persuade Butler to stay and play for the
team—which forced the Timberwolves to reluctantly trade Butler to the
Philadelphia 76ers in exchange for Robert Covington, Dario Saric, Jerryd
Bayless, and a 2022 second-round draft pick).
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The overall purpose of this Article is to determine what
recourse a professional sports franchise has when a player under
contract with the franchise refuses to play pursuant to their
agreement. First, this Article will explain what a player hold
out is and the additional underlying factors that lead to players
holding out, including the problems the player’s hold out creates
for the team, the franchise, and the fans. Next, the Article will
examine whether a player hold out constitutes a breach of
contract, which would permit the franchise to seek recourse.
Additionally, if a breach has occurred, this Article will assess the
remedies a franchise can seek as a result of the player’s breach
of contract. This Article will then address which contractual
remedy is most realistic at present. Finally, this Article will
suggest how the franchises may seek to prevent or mitigate
future hold outs, either through the leagues’ adoption of a
system of binding arbitration to settle disputes or through “selfhelp specific performance.”
II. What Are Player “Hold Outs,” Why Do They Occur, and
What Problems Do They Create?
The process of “holding out” is refusing to go along with
others in a concerted action or failing to come to an agreement.9
A “holdout” is an individual who delays signing a contract in
hopes of gaining more favorable terms.10 Thus, for our purposes,
a holdout can be understood as a professional athlete who
refuses to come to an agreement until the franchise gives the
athlete the consideration the athlete seeks. Former NFL head
coach and current NBC football analyst, Tony Dungy, indicated
his understanding that there are a myriad of reasons modern
professional athletes hold out.11 Dungy says that because the
careers of NFL players are so short,12 the players need to “take
9
Hold
Out,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/hold%20out (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
10 Holdout, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/holdout
(last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
11 Scott Davis, Tony Dungy Explains the Simple Reason Why NFL players
Hold Out for New and Bigger Contracts, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2018, 5:19
PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/tony-dungy-nfl-player-contractholdouts-2018-8.
12 See John Keim, With Average NFL Career 3.3 Years, Players Motivated
to
Complete
MBA
Program,
ESPN
(July
29,
2016),
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advantage of [their earning capacity] while [they] can.”13 At the
same time, because of the injury risks inherent in professional
sports—especially in the NFL—players are under the constant
threat of sustaining a career-ending injury. Sustaining a careerending injury, or sustaining an injury which may inhibit a player
from utilizing an attribute the player brings to the team (e.g.,
speed, arm strength, shooting ability), may restrict the player
from reaching his maximum earning potential if the player can
no longer offer value to the franchise.14 Therefore, because of
the ever-present risk of injury, a player is incentivized to hold
out so that the player can accrue the highest possible salary.
Another concern players face is that there are a finite
number of years in which each player can earn top dollar. One’s
“prime” is the most attractive, thriving, or satisfying stage or
period of one’s life or career.15 When a player is said to be in his
prime, the player is typically producing at the highest possible
level that the player is capable of achieving. Elias Sports
Bureau estimates that a player hits his prime at the age of
twenty-nine in the MLB, twenty-seven in the NHL, and twentysix in the NBA and NFL.16 A player’s prime can be as short as
one season17 or spread across multiple seasons. Of course, there
are players who are outliers that can produce at a high level for
many years.18 Nevertheless, in an ideal situation, a player
http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/207780/current-and-former-nflplayers-in-the-drivers-seat-after-completing-mba-program
(citing
NFL
Players’ Association). To Tony Dungy’s point, the average NFL career lasts 3.3
years.
13 Davis, supra note 11.
14 Id.
15 Prime, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016).
16 ESPN Stats & Info, Average Age in Esports vs. Major Sports, ESPN
(Sept. 17, 2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/20733853/theaverage-age-esports-versus-nfl-nba-mlb-nhl.
17
For example, in the 2005–2006 NHL season, San Jose Sharks twentyfive-year-old forward, Jonathan Cheechoo, scored fifty-six goals and won the
Maurice “Rocket” Richard Trophy as the league’s top goal scorer. See Jonathan
Cheechoo,
HOCKEY
REFERENCE,
https://www.hockeyreference.com/players/c/cheecjo01.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). Due to
injuries and decline, however, Cheechoo never got close to his award-winning
pace ever again and retired from the NHL after the 2009–2010 season. See id.
18
For example, hockey legend and 1972 Hockey Hall of Fame Inductee
Gordie Howe played in the NHL at a high level from the age of twenty-one,
when Howe scored sixty-eight points and made his second All-Star appearance,
until the age of forty-nine, when Howe accounted for ninety-six points. See
Gordie
Howe,
HOCKEY
REFERENCE,
https://www.hockey-
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would, upon completing his initial contract (whether it be an
entry-level contract,19 a rookie contract,20 or ceasing to be
arbitration eligible),21 sign a contract with a team in their prime
years to attain their maximum earning potential. However,
because players hit their primes at different times 22—and
because there is a conflict of interest between the team, which
reference.com/players/h/howego01.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
19 An entry-level contract (“ELC”) is signed by players that are younger
than twenty-five years old and who seek to play in the NHL. Collective
Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League and National
Hockey League Players’ Association, Art. 9.1(b) (Feb. 15, 2013),
https://cdn.nhlpa.com/img/assets/file/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf
[hereinafter NHL CBA]. If a player between the ages of eighteen and twentyone signs an ELC, the contract must be for three years; if a player that is
twenty-two or twenty-three years old signs an ELC, the contract must be for
two years; and if the player is twenty-four years old or older, the ELC can only
be for one year. Id.
20 NFL and NBA players each sign rookie contracts after they are drafted
to play in each league, respectively. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between
National Football League and National Football League Players Association,
Art.
7(3)(a)
(Mar.
5,
2020),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL
-NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA]. In the NFL, the
duration of a rookie contract ranges between three and five years, depending
on when (or if) the player was drafted. Id. If the player was drafted in the first
round of their draft, the contract would be for four years with a fifth-year
option; if the player was drafted in rounds two through seven of their draft
year, the contract was for four years; if the player was not drafted, the contract
would be for three years. Id. In the NBA, a player signs a rookie contract for
two years with team options to keep the player under contract for the third and
fourth years in the NBA. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the
National Basketball Association and the National Basketball Association
Players’ Association, Art. 8(1)(a) (Jan. 19, 2017), https://cosmics3.imgix.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-2017-NBA-NBPACollective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf [hereinafter NBA CBA].
21 After a player has played in the MLB for six years or more, the player
no longer must submit to binding arbitration with his club and can become a
free agent. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Major League Baseball
and Major League Baseball Players’ Association, Art. XX(B)(1) (2017),
https://d39ba378-ae47-4003-86d3147e4fa6e51b.filesusr.com/ugd/b0a4c2_95883690627349e0a5203f61b93715b5.
pdf [hereinafter MLB CBA].
22 For example, veteran Boston Bruins goaltender Tim Thomas did not
hit his prime years until his mid-to-late thirties. See Tim Thomas, HOCKEY
REFERENCE, https://www.hockey-reference.com/players/t/thomati01.html. In
fact, Thomas won his first Vezina Trophy, as the NHL’s best goaltender, at the
age of 34, which is an age when many other NHL goaltenders begin their
decline. Id. Thomas later followed this up two years later by again winning
the Vezina Trophy, claiming the Conn Smythe trophy as the 2011 NHL
Playoffs MVP, and becoming a champion by hoisting the Stanley Cup. Id.
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seeks to sign the player for the lowest possible sum for the
shortest possible term, and the player, who seeks to attain the
greatest salary for the longest term23—such an equilibrium is
rarely struck. Thus, it becomes more likely that as the term of
a contract progresses, the franchise or the player is likely to
want to get out of the agreement: either because the franchise
sees the player as too costly for the value that the player
provides, or because the player feels he is not being paid enough.
In some professional sports leagues, franchises have several
options for recourse, including: ending contracts that, in
hindsight, turn out to be unwise investments by “buying out” a
player’s contract24; cutting a player because the contract is not a
guaranteed contract25; or, if a player has a guaranteed contract,
a franchise may still cut a player so long as the franchise pays
the player the remainder of the money the player is entitled to
under the contract.26 While there are steps franchises can take
when a contract with a player turns out to be a bad investment,
the players have little recourse when they feel undervalued.27
When a player feels this way, his only options essentially become
to request a trade or to request a new contract.28 And if the
player’s request for a new contract is not granted, the player’s
remaining options are to hold out or play under a contract that
they feel does not reflect their true value.
A player’s hold out can be felt at various levels of the
Loeb, supra note 4, at 275.
For example, in the NHL, when a team “buys out” a player either by
an “ordinary course” buyout—where the team buys out the player and the
bought out player’s salary counts against the cap for twice the remaining
length of the contract—or by “compliance” buyout, the team is permitted to pay
the bought out player two-thirds of the player’s remaining salary over twice
the remaining length of the contract. See NHL CBA, supra note 19, at Art.
50.9(i). Compliance buyouts, however, do not count against a team’s salary
cap. Id. In both “buy out” situations, the buyout team is still mandated to pay
the remainder of the buyout player’s salary. Id.
25 For example, in the NFL, a player contract can be terminated if the
team determines that “the player . . . is anticipated to make less of a
contribution to the Club’s ability to compete on the playing field than another
player.” NFL CBA, supra note 20, at Art. 4(5)(d).
26 For example, in the MLB, players are guaranteed to receive the salary
agreed to in the contract regardless of whether the player’s contract is
terminated or not. MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Appendix A: Major League
Uniform Player’s Contract, ¶ 2.
27 See Loeb, supra note 4, at 275.
28 Id. at 279.
23
24
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franchise. However, the most affected parties—both in terms of
power to end the hold out and the parties who stand to lose the
most from the hold out—are the owner and the franchise’s
management (collectively, “management”). Management can, of
course, end a hold out by acquiescing to the player’s demand of
giving the player a new contract or trading the player to a
different team. However, these are not attractive options
because of the dangerous precedent it sets for the franchise’s
future dealings.29 On the other hand, should management refuse
to end the hold out, management may suffer other consequences.
One such consequence may be speculation by the sports media
as to why management has not ended the hold out.30 While the
sports media are doing this, they may also be casting a negative
image of the franchise to its audience.
Another consequence may include a decrease of fan support
and involvement with the franchise. When a player holds out
and refuses to play for his team unless his demands are met,
that player’s fans are denied the opportunity to watch their star
player play for their favorite team.31 Because the player who
withholds his services is typically valuable to his team,32 the
player’s hold out has a negative effect on the team’s
performance.33 Moreover, because the team may not be as good,
there is less incentive for fans of the franchise to attend games,
follow the team’s progress, or make purchases related to the
franchise such as concessions at games and team paraphernalia.
The impact of the player hold out spreads through various levels
of the franchise: from management, to the team, and, ultimately,

29
See, e.g., Sheil Kapadia, Kam Chancellor Ends Contract Holdout,
Returns
to
Seahawks,
ESPN
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/13722598/kam-chancellor-end-contractholdout-return-seattle-seahawks. (reporting on Seattle Seahawk Kam
Chancellor’s hold out from his contract for eight weeks during the 2015 NFL
season until he received the new contract he desired); Herbie Teope, Earl
Thomas Rejoins Seattle Seahawks After Holdout, NFL (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:19
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000958380/article/earl-thomasrejoins-seattle-seahawks-after-holdout (reporting that less than three years
later, fellow Seahawk and friend of Kam Chancellor, Earl Thomas, also held
out from his contract; unlike Chancellor, though, Thomas did not miss any
regular season games).
30 Loeb, supra note 4, at 279, n. 24.
31 Id. at 277.
32 Id. at 276.
33 Id. at 277.

7

2020

HOLDING OUT FOR A BETTER DEAL

339

to the fans. Thus, when a player holds out, it creates a ripple
effect that results in fans suffering the repercussions.
Player hold outs are divisive and affect not only the
relationship between the player and the franchise’s
management, but also the player’s teammates and the
franchise’s fans. When a player holds out from his contract, the
player creates a tumultuous atmosphere that affects the overall
team dynamic and the other players on the team. An example
of this can be seen from the handling of a former star player,
Jimmy Butler, by the NBA’s Minnesota Timberwolves in 2018.
Prior to the Timberwolves trading Butler, who was holding out
from his contract, Butler made an appearance at the
Timberwolves’ practice on October 10, 2018.34 During that
practice, Butler gathered members of the Timberwolves third
team players to play on his team, 35 faced off against high-profile
members of the Timberwolves in mini, inter-squad scrimmages,
and proceeded to berate young stars Karl-Anthony Towns and
Andrew Wiggins.36 During the scrimmage, Butler told Towns
and Wiggins that “[Towns and Wiggins] ain’t [sic] [expletive]!”;
and, referring to Towns specifically, said, “[Towns] can’t do
[expletive] against me!”37 On top of Butler’s negative comments,
Butler also continued acting in an antagonistic manner that was
not conducive to building positive team chemistry.38 As the
practice continued, it became apparent that Butler’s comments
bothered Towns and added additional vitriol to Butler’s hold out
situation with Timberwolves’ management.39
Butler
intentionally created this negative atmosphere, and the effect of
his comments and demeanor towards his teammates was to let
the Timberwolves know that, if the team did not acquiesce to
Butler’s trade demand, Butler would continue his negative,

34 Jon Krawczynski & Shams Charania, Jimmy Butler Returns to Bring
More Chaos to the Wolves, Just as He Promised, ATHLETIC (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://theathletic.com/580655/2018/10/11/jimmy-butler-return-timberwolveschaos-tom-thibodeau-trade-request/.
35 Id.
36 Chris Haynes, Sources: Karl-Anthony Towns, Andrew Wiggins Primary
Targets of Jimmy Butler’s Practice Insults, YAHOO SPORTS (Oct. 10, 2018, 6:06
PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/sources-karl-anthony-towns-andrew-wigginsprimary-targets-jimmy-butlers-practice-insults-220611226.html.
37 Id.
38 See Krawczynski & Charania, supra note 34.
39 Id.
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antagonistic behavior.40 This example illustrates that while a
holdout is still participating with the team, he can create an
environment that is detrimental to the team atmosphere and
essentially force the organization’s hand: either acquiesce to the
player’s demands, or suffer the negativity the player may bring
to the team culture. In the Butler example, Butler was traded
to the Philadelphia 76ers in return for three players and a draft
pick, which did not accurately reflect Butler’s value as a player.41
III. When a Player Holds Out, Does That Constitute a Breach
of Contract?
For there to be an enforceable contract, there must be a
manifestation of mutual assent,42 consideration,43 and no
defenses that can affect the enforceability of the contract.44 The
bargain struck between the franchise and the player is an
exchange of promises45: the franchise promises to pay the player
for the term of the contract in exchange for the player’s promise
to play pursuant to the terms of the contract. When a player
holds out from his contract, the hold out affects the
manifestation of assent of the original agreement between the
player and the franchise.46 When performance of a duty under
Id.
See ESPN, supra note 8.
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See
also Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778–79
(Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (“[I]t is said that the meeting of minds, which is essential
to the formation of a contract, is not determined by the secret intention of the
parties, but by their expressed intention, which may be wholly at variance with
the former.”).
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See,
e.g., Ala. Football, Inc. v. Wright, 452 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (holding
that a football player’s contracted-for performance is valuable consideration in
a sports contract).
44 Common defenses against an otherwise enforceable contract include:
illegality of the subject matter; incapacity; mistake (both mutual and
unilateral); fraud; duress; undue influence; impossibility; violation of statute
of frauds; and public policy concerns. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 12–16, 110, 151–53, 159–64, 174–78, 208, 261 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See
generally Wright, 452 F. Supp. at 182.
46 The two parties (the player and the franchise) would have already
manifested their assent to comply with the terms of the contract when the
contract is signed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW
40
41

9

2020

HOLDING OUT FOR A BETTER DEAL

341

a contract is due, any non-performance is a breach.47 The
“performance of a duty,” in the context of a player contract,
would be for the player to play for the franchise for the term of
the contract. When this performance fails to occur at the time it
becomes due, the player is in breach of contract.
Furthermore, the player’s breach may be a material breach.
Determining if a material breach has occurred is significant
because, if the player’s breach of contract with his franchise is a
material breach, the uncured material performance not only
entitles the non-breaching party to recover damages, but
permits the non-breaching party to suspend its own performance
due under the contract.48 When determining whether a material
breach has occurred, the injured party (here, the franchise)
considers circumstances including: the extent to which the
injured party is deprived of the benefit the party reasonably
expected to receive; and the extent to which the injured party
can be adequately compensated for the part of the benefit which
he will be deprived.49 The party failing to perform (here, the
holdout) evaluates circumstances including: the extent to which
the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture; the likelihood
that the party failing to perform will cure his failure; and the
extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform
comports with the standard of good faith and fair dealing, which
is implied in every contract.50 When a hold out occurs, the
INST. 1981).
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See
Kehm Corp. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 620, 625 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (holding that
defendant’s failure to timely procure an essential component of plaintiff’s
product constituted breach of contract).
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See
also Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (where a
construction company installed “Cohoes” pipes instead of “Reading” pipes in
part of a house, and the pipes are similar in nearly every aspect except for the
name, the homeowner breached the contract with the construction company by
refusing to pay the remaining balance after the house was constructed. The
New York Court of Appeals held that, though the construction company
breached the contract by failing to install “Reading” pipe, the breach was not
material, and since the construction company substantially performed the rest
of the contract, the homeowner was ordered to pay the balance.).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See
N. Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546, 553 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (stating that, in
determining loss of benefit to the injured party, all relevant circumstances
must be considered).
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See
Prescott & Co., Ltd. v. J.B. Powles & Co., 193 P. 680, 681-82 (Wash. 1920)
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franchise: (1) is completely deprived of the player’s promised
performance under the contract, due to the player’s abstinence
from playing for the franchise; and (2) cannot be compensated
by the holdout, except to the extent that the franchise may be
able to withhold payments the player would have been entitled
to had the player performed pursuant to the contract. The
player holding out, conversely: (1) may suffer salary forfeiture
which the franchise would otherwise be obligated to pay the
player under the contract; (2) is unlikely to cure his failure to
perform until the player either obtains his new contract or is
traded to a team that will give the player such a contract; and
(3) is not behaving in a way that comports with the standards of
good faith and fair dealing that are implied in the contract
because the player is refusing to play for the term of the contract
until his demands are met. While the player may stand to forfeit
the salary he would otherwise be entitled to if the player did not
hold out, in the analysis of whether a breach of contract is
material, most of the significant factors suggest that the hold out
has a negative effect on the franchise. Furthermore, because the
player’s contract is a performance contract (for the player to play
for the franchise), the player’s failure to render his performance
when his performance would be due would force the franchise to
forfeit the benefit of its bargain and leave the franchise with an
uncured failure by the player (the breaching party). Thus, when
a player holds out from his contract, the hold out is a material
breach of contract.
Professor Alex M. Johnson, Jr. argued that player hold outs
constitute a breach of contract, and that the theory of
“opportunistic behavior,” which has not been recognized to
encompass breaches of contract, should be expanded to include
professional athlete hold outs.51 Professor Johnson notes that
the theory of opportunistic behavior has traditionally been
(demonstrating that the party who committed material breach was not entitled
to payment under the contract after the non-breaching party refused to pay for
the goods contracted for; the breaching party thereby suffered the forfeiture of
the goods).
51 See generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Argument for Self-Help Specific
Performance: Opportunistic Renegotiation of Player Contracts, 22 CONN. L.
REV. 61 (1989) (arguing, generally, that professional sports franchises should
be able to acquiesce to a holdout’s demand and later sue the holdout for the
difference between the original salary and the holdout’s new salary, under the
theory of economic duress.).

11

2020

HOLDING OUT FOR A BETTER DEAL

343

defined as behavior that does not rise to a breach of contract, but
occurs when a party acts in a manner that is “contrary to the
other party’s understanding of their contract, but not necessarily
contrary to the agreement’s explicit terms, leading to a transfer
of wealth from the other party to the performer . . . .”52 In
Professor Johnson’s view, this is the type of behavior that courts
and society should endeavor to curtail.53 Professor Johnson uses
the example of Eric Dickerson, the former star running back for
the Los Angeles Rams in the NFL, to illustrate how
opportunistic behavior by a player leaves essentially no remedy
to the other party to the contract, the team who employs the
player.54 Dickerson held out twice from the Rams: once in 1985,
and, again, from 1987 through October of 1988.55 Both times, he
used his position as a star player to leverage better contract
terms.56 Professor Johnson argued that, though this behavior is
of the variety that society would not find acceptable, there is,
presently, no effective remedy whereby the franchise can
effectively counteract the holdout’s behavior.57
Professor Johnson adds further credence to the view that
when a player holds out from his contract, he has breached his
contract. In each of the major professional sports league’s
present collective bargaining agreements, the sample contracts
attached to those agreements indicate that the player must play
for the team which holds the player’s playing rights.58
Therefore, when the player fails to play, or the player does not
perform when the player promised to, a breach of contract has
occurred.59 And because the performance was an essential term
of the contract, the failure to perform makes the nonperformance
a material breach because the franchise, as the injured party, is
52 Id. at 74 (citing Timothy Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law
of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 522 (1981)).
53 Johnson, supra note 51, at 73.
54 Id. at 70–72.
55 Id. at 71–72.
56 Id. When Dickerson held out the second time, the Rams were left no
other choice than to trade Dickerson to the Indianapolis Colts after Dickerson
“implied that his dispute with Los Angeles had taken such a toll on him that
he might not be able to give his all on the field.” Id. at 71.
57 Id. at 73–74.
58 See generally MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Appendix A, cl. 1; NBA CBA,
supra note 20, at Exhibit A, cl. 2; NFL CBA, supra note 20, at App. A, cl. 2;
NHL CBA, supra note 19, at Exhibit 1, cl. 2.
59 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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completely deprived of the player’s performance as a result of
the hold out, and the franchise has no recourse aside from
withholding the player’s salary.
The player’s breach of contract by engaging in a hold out
may also be a partial breach, which would still allow the
franchise to recover. A partial breach of contract is less
significant than a material breach because a partial breach does
not necessarily render the entire contract inoperable but,
instead, gives the aggrieved party a right to damages by a small
reduction in payment or other adjustment.60 A partial breach
claim is for damages based on only part of the injured party’s
remaining rights to performance.61 This means that if the
injured party elects to, or is required to, await the balance of the
other party’s performance under the contract, the injured party’s
claim is said instead to be one for damages for partial breach.62
The injured party can maintain a partial breach action at once,
but the party is not permitted to stop further performance by the
wrongdoer and get damages for the anticipated future nonperformance, as well as for the past non-performance
constituting the partial breach.63 Section 236 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts provides a helpful demonstration of a
partial breach:
A contracts with B to build a building on B’s land,
work to commence on May 1 and to be completed
by October 1. On May 10, A has not yet
commenced work. If the court concludes that A’s
breach, although material, has not continued for
such a length of time that B is discharged, B has
a claim against A for damages caused by the
delay, but this is not a claim for damages based on
all of B’s remaining rights to performance. B’s
claim is one for damages for partial breach.64

60
Partial Breach Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/partial-breach (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
62 Id. at § 236, cmt. b.
63 10 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 53.4 (2019).
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236, illus. 1 (A M. LAW INST.
1981).
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Here, the franchise, as the injured party, is entitled to the
holdout’s full performance under the contract. So, when the
player holds out, the franchise instantly has a cause of action
against the holdout because the holdout’s delay in performance
will have harmed the franchise. The franchise may choose to
wait before suing the holdout, even though the franchise is
entitled to recovery once the breach occurs, because, if the player
commits total breach,65 the franchise would be discharged from
its remaining promises made to the player under the contract.66
A total breach is defined as “one that so substantially impairs
the value of the contract to the injured party at the time of the
breach that it is just in the circumstances to allow him to recover
damages based on all his remaining rights to performance.”67
Furthermore, if the contract is repudiated and the player refuses
to perform,68 the franchise is able to successfully bring an action
for total breach. However, very few professional athlete
holdouts would ever rise to the level of a total breach. Players
who have contracts with their franchise typically would commit
a total breach only if they are seeking to breach their contract
and play in another league in another country.69 But even then,
the franchise can seek a negative injunction against the player
to restrict the player’s ability to play elsewhere.70 In sum,
generally, when the player holds out by simply not performing
when performance becomes due, the franchise is instantly
entitled to recover for the player’s partial breach, should the
franchise elect to do so.71

Id. at § 243, cmt. B.
See id. at § 243(1).
67 First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 765, 799
(Fed. Cl. 2009).
68 See Fox v. Dehn, 116 Cal. Rptr. 786, 790-91(Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (holding
that a total repudiation combined with the nonperformance by the breaching
party necessitated the injured parties to bring action immediately while the
breaching party was still alive; once the breaching party died, the injured
parties no longer had a cause of action for either total or partial breach).
69 See, e.g., Mike Mazzeo, Ilya Kovalchuk Leaves $77M on Table, ESPN
(July 11, 2013), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nhl/story/_/id/9470677/ilyakovalchuk-new-jersey-devils-announces-retire (reporting on then-NHL star
Ilya Kovalchuk’s total breach of his fifteen-year contract after playing under
the contract’s terms for only three seasons; Kovalchuk “retired” from the NHL
so that he could play in the KHL, a league in Kovalchuk’s native Russia).
70 See infra notes 88–93.
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 378 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
65
66
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IV. What Remedy is Available to the Franchise When a Player
Holds Out?
As it has been established that the actions of a professional
athlete who holds out from his contract can give rise to either a
material or partial breach, it is next necessary to determine
what remedy or remedies the franchise can seek as damages.
There are three main contractual “interests” available when a
party breaches: (1) expectation; (2) reliance; and (3) restitution
interests.72 Recovering expectation damages would entitle the
injured party to receive the “benefit of his bargain,” or, in other
words, to be put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed.73 Reliance damages, on the
other hand, reimburse the injured party for any losses caused by
relying on the contract.74 This is achieved by putting the injured
party in as good a position as he would have been had the
contract not been made.75 The final contractual remedy
available to the non-breaching party is restitution damages,
which restores to the injured party any benefit the injured party
conferred on the breaching party.76
Expectation damages, though the most desirable remedy to
the franchise who possesses the holdout’s playing rights, are
unlikely to be awarded to the franchise in a breach of contract
action. As stated above, in a player’s contract, the franchise
promises to pay the player a specified amount of money in
exchange for the player’s promise to play pursuant to the
contract. Thus, the franchise’s benefit of its bargain, as it relates
to player contracts, is for the player to play under the terms of
the original agreement. However, there are multiple issues
facing the franchise if it were to seek expectation damages when
a player holds out. First, there is a lack of reasonable certainty
as to what the value the franchise would receive under the
contract had the contract been performed.
The term
“consequential damages” is often used with respect to harm
suffered as a “consequence” of the breach of duty, but not as a
72 Id. at § 344. See § 344, illustration 2 for an example on how each
interest is computed.
73 Id. at § 344(a).
74 Id. at § 344(b).
75 Id.
76 Id. at § 344(c).
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direct,
immediate,
and
foreseeable
consequence.77
Consequential damages differ from “direct” damages in that
direct damages are foreseeable to any reasonable person in the
position of the parties, whereas consequential damages are
sometimes considered “special” damages because they may only
be recovered if the breaching party (the holdout) is aware of
special circumstances.78 When evidence cannot establish with
reasonable certainty what the damages should be, the damages
are not recoverable.79 In Atlantic City Associates, LLC v. Carter
& Burgess Consultants, Inc.,80 the Third Circuit held that the
difference between direct and consequential damages depends
on whether the damages represent: (1) a loss in value of the
other party’s performance, which are direct damages; or (2)
collateral losses following the breach, which are consequential
damages.81
Here, the damages sustained by the franchise are
consequential and not direct damages under the Atlantic City
Associates test.82 While it is true that the franchise loses the
value of the player’s performance, the player also loses the
benefit of his salary. Since both the franchise and the player
lose their bargained for consideration when a hold out occurs,
the hold out therefore constitutes a consequential breach. This
is because both the franchise and the holdout stand to lose
something of value originally promised to each party under the
contract: the franchise is forced to do without the player’s
performance while the holdout is forced to go without his
promised compensation. However, the franchise would not be
able to prove with reasonable certainty that the player holding
out would be responsible for, say, a certain number of wins,
which would subsequently contribute a certain sum of funds to
the franchise’s coffers, had the player not held out. Additionally,
such a remedy, relating to a player’s absence to monetary
damages sustained by the franchise, would also not be the
“probable result of the breach when the contract was made”83

77
78
79
80
81
82
83

11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 56.6 (2018).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
453 Fed. Appx. 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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because: (1) neither the player nor the franchise would have
been able to anticipate how many wins the franchise would
secure resulting from the player signing the contract; and (2)
neither the player nor the franchise would have been able to
anticipate how much money the franchise would be able to gain
resulting from the player’s performance in securing each win at
the time of the formation of the contract. Similarly, it would be
impossible for the franchise to prove with “reasonable certainty,”
as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts requires, which profits
were forfeited or which losses the franchise sustained resulting
from the hold out.84 Thus, expectation damages, beyond some
number measured by the player’s salary, cannot be awarded to
the franchise when the potential damages are not reasonably
certain or do not arise naturally out of the player’s breach85 (by
holding out).
The franchise could, however, pursue a negative injunction
when a player holds out. Courts have recognized that when an
athlete threatens not to perform under their contract, a court
may order a negative injunction to restrict the athlete from
playing for another team.86 Under the Lumley v. Wagner
doctrine, though employees cannot be forced to “produce as
nearly as is practicable the same effect that the performance due
under a contract would have produced,”87 the employees may be
enjoined from working for a competitor.88 In Lumley, plaintiff
Benjamin Lumley signed Johanna Wagner, an opera singer, to
a performance contract for Wagner to perform at Lumley’s opera
house in London.89 Wagner was later enticed to perform at the
Royal Italian Opera, Covent Garden, by its owner, Frederick
Gye.90 Wagner’s breach of contract prompted Lumley to sue,
seeking to bar Wagner from appearing “anywhere on the London
stage, rather than simply . . . [seeking] damages for breach of
See also Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
85 See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 150.
86
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Affirmative Injunctions in Athletic
Employment Contracts: Rethinking the Place of the Lumley Rule in American
Sports Law, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 261, 262 (2006).
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357, cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
88 See Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687.
89 Id. at 688.
90 Id.
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contract.”91
The Lumley court refused to implement an
affirmative injunction, stating it was “[b]eyond all doubt this
Court could not interfere to enforce the specific performance of
the whole contract.”92 However, the court stated a negative
injunction—meaning a court-ordered restriction from Wagner
singing at Gye’s theater—may be appropriate because the court
“will not suffer the parties to depart from their contracts at their
pleasure, leaving the party with whom they have contracted to
the mere chance of any damages which the jury may give.”93
Applying Lumley to professional athlete contract hold outs,
courts cannot order players threatening to hold out to abide by
the terms of their contract. However, if the player holds out, the
courts can order that the player cannot play for another team.
Like Johanna Wagner in Lumley, professional athletes offer
skills and attributes that are not easy to obtain, especially when
a player produces at a high level. This has led courts to treat
professional athletes as “prima facie unique.”94 Accordingly,
American courts have ordered negative injunctions on
professional athletes seeking to breach their contract for more
lucrative, enticing offers.95 Those courts have reasoned that
because normal contractual remedies would be insufficient to
protect the aggrieved party when a player under contract agrees
to play for a rival team, a negative injunction can be awarded so
that the team does not suffer great damage.96 The obvious
91 Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine:
Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L. J. 775, 792
(1991).
92 Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 688.
93 Id.
94 Casey Duncan, Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball’s United StatesJapanese Player Contract Agreement Enough to Avoid Another “Baseball
War”?, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 87, 107 (2003).
95 See Rapp, supra note 86, at 266–67 (citing Phila. Ball Club, Ltd. v.
Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902) (holding that a star player like Lajoie cannot sign
a contract with a rival team when his current team owns his rights and Lajoie’s
salary demands were not met)). See also Cent. N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett,
181 N.E.2d 506, 517 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas, Cuyahoga Cty. 1961) (holding
that “professional players in the major baseball, football, and basketball
leagues have unusual talents and skills or they would not be so employed. Such
players, the defendant Barnett included, are not easily replaced.” Thus, when
a rival basketball team sought to “woo” Barnett after he had already agreed to
terms with the team who obtained his playing rights, the court issued a
negative injunction from Barnett joining the team that subsequently wooed
him).
96 See Lajoie, 51 A. at 975; Barnett, 181 N.E.2d at 517.
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drawback with negative injunctions, from management’s
perspective, is that though the player cannot play for a rival
franchise, the negative injunction does not necessitate the
player to play for your franchise. Therefore, while negative
injunctions may be a useful tool for management when a holdout
seeks to either play on another team or in another league, an
injunction does not resolve the issues that come with a hold out
because the player may still choose to not play at all.
The franchise may also contend that, due to the uniqueness
of the performance the player is contractually obligated to
render, specific performance should be granted to protect the
benefit of the franchise’s bargain. Specific performance is a
drastic remedy97 and is typically only granted when no other
appropriate remedy is available.98
Generally, specific
performance is granted only when the injured party has
contracted for a unique good, such as real estate.99 Courts do not
specifically enforce a contractual promise to render personal
service,100 however, nor will courts enforce an injunction
“against serving another if its probable result will be to compel
a performance involving personal relations the enforced
continuance of which is undesirable.”101 The refusal is based in
part upon the “undesirability of compelling the continuance of
personal association after disputes have arisen and confidence
and loyalty are gone.”102 Further, compelling an individual to
provide personal service raises public policy issues because an
order to provide personal service violates the Thirteenth
Amendment.103 Thus, the franchise will likely not be awarded
specific performance when a player holds out from their contract
because of constitutional concerns and the general position of
97 See, e.g., LocusPoint Networks, LLC v. D.T.V. LLC, No. 14-cv-01278JSC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113356, at *57 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015) (citing
Estate of Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1158 (Del. 2010)).
98 See Van Wagner Advert. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 759
(N.Y. 1986) (holding that when there are other adequate remedies available,
specific performance will not be the remedy; however, it is possible for specific
performance to be granted for real property).
99 See Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557, 571–72 (1869); Ash Park, LLC v.
Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 783 N.W.2d 294, 303–04 (Wis. 2010).
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
101 Id. at § 367 cmt. b.
102 Id. at § 367 cmt. a.
103 See Loeb, supra note 4, at 287, n. 64 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII).
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courts not to grant specific performance of personal service
contracts.
Like expectation damages, reliance damages are also
unlikely to be awarded to a franchise when a player holds out
from his contract.
Reliance damages are calculated by
identifying the expenditures made in preparation for
performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove
with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered
had the contract been performed.104 An injured party is likely to
pursue this remedy when he cannot prove his profit with
reasonable certainty.105 As discussed in Section II, supra, when
a player holds out, there will be effects on the franchise’s
management, fans, and the team itself. In this situation, it
would be difficult to discern which expenditures were made in
preparation specifically for the holdout, which would permit the
franchise to recover reliance damages. For example, assume an
NHL franchise is expecting a player to serve as its starting
goaltender. Goaltender is an important position in hockey
because having a quality goaltender can be the difference
between missing the playoffs, making the playoffs, or winning
the Stanley Cup. Should that goaltender hold out from his
contract, the NHL franchise would be unable to prove with
reasonable certainty which expenditures the franchise made in
relying on that player to be its goaltender in relation to the
general expenditures the franchise would be making for the
team. As in the analysis for uncertainty with expectation
damages, reliance damages are also unlikely to be awarded to
the franchise because of the difficulty associated with
determining the franchise’s expenditures made in preparation
for the holdout’s performance. Similarly, determining how a
franchise would be “put in as good a position as [it] would have
been in had the contract not been made” would be an equally
difficult exercise because it cannot be said that all of the
franchise’s expenses going into the season are made for the
holdout.
The final contractual remedy that may be available to a
franchise when a player holds out is restitution damages.
Restitution requires the party who received a benefit from the

104
105

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id. at §349 cmt. a.
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injured party to return that benefit to the injured party.106
When a player holds out from his contract, the player is
breaching his contract and injuring the franchise.
The
computation of restitution in that case would be simple: by
refusing to play, the benefit conferred on the player (the player’s
salary) is to be returned to the franchise while the player is
holding out.107 The reasoning makes sense: because the player
is withholding his services to the franchise, the franchise is
entitled to withhold paying the player his salary. And, in the
event the franchise has already paid the player either a portion
or the entirety of his salary, the franchise is entitled to have the
salary returned. In fact, each major professional sports league
in the United States—the MLB, NFL, NHL, and NBA—has such
a rule stated either in its uniform player contracts108 or in the
league’s collective bargaining agreement.109 It is therefore
evident that the current, easiest-to-measure contractual remedy
available to professional sports franchises is to withhold a
player’s salary—or to be granted the right to have the salary the
franchise has conferred on the holdout returned to the
franchise—when the player holds out from his contract, because
otherwise the player would be unjustly enriched.
V. What Are Some Potential Actions Professional Sports
Franchises Can Take to Deter or Mitigate Player Hold
Outs?
Though professional sports franchises may have the right to
have the salary the franchise would otherwise be obligated to
pay the player returned to the franchise’s coffers when the
player holds out from his contract, or potentially receive a
negative injunction prohibiting the holdout joining another
franchise, this is far from ideal for the franchise. The franchise
Id. at § 370.
Id. at § 371 cmt. a (“[A] party who is liable in restitution for a sum of
money must pay an amount equal to the benefit that has been conferred upon
him. If the benefit consists simply of a sum of money received by the party from
whom restitution is sought, there is no difficulty in determining this amount.”).
108
See MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Appendix A: Uniform Player’s
Contract, ¶ 4(a); NBA CBA, supra note 20, at Exhibit A: National Basketball
Association Uniform Player Contract, ¶ 9; NHL CBA, supra note 19, at Exhibit
1: Standard Player’s Contract, ¶ 6.
109 See NFL CBA, supra note 20, at Art. 4(9)(a).
106
107
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would prefer the player to play for the franchise, help improve
the performance of the team, and generate greater revenue for
the franchise. A hold out is not an ideal situation for the player
either, considering that the player is not entitled to his salary
because of his refusal to play; moreover, the player cannot play
the sport in which he is a professional because doing so would
result in the holdout’s acquiescence to his current rate of pay.
There must be an alternative that could assist both parties to
resolve their labor dispute and permit each party to receive at
least a portion of the consideration each party would otherwise
sacrifice as a result of a player hold out. The best alternatives
to a player hold out would be to either: (1) institute a system of
binding arbitration when a player seeks to hold out from his
current contract with the franchise that owns the player’s
playing rights; or (2) implement a self-help specific performance
remedy for the franchise. Under a system of binding arbitration,
the player and team would each submit its perceived value of the
player to the arbitrator or arbitrators who would then choose one
party’s proposal; and that decision would be binding on both
parties.110 Under the self-help specific performance remedy, the
franchise may acquiesce to the player’s new contract demand,
and, subsequent to the full performance of the player, the
franchise may challenge the modification by the player either on
the basis that the modification was not supported by
consideration or that the player made the franchise agree to the
modification through economic duress.111
A. Binding Arbitration
Before delving into what a system of binding arbitration
would look like in practice in professional sports, it is necessary
to note that binding arbitrations will not have any effect unless
these methods of dispute resolution become part of the collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the league and the
players’ association of that league. Regarding a labor dispute
between the East Coast Hockey League and the Professional
Hockey Players’ Association, the Fourth Circuit held that
110
Arbitration,
A.B.A.
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeRes
olutionProcesses/arbitration/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
111 See Johnson, supra note 51, at 92–102.
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“arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed so to submit.”112 Therefore, because the CBA is the
governing document between management and the labor union,
it is necessary for each side to adopt the binding arbitration and
self-help specific performance provisions into each league’s next
CBA. Once adopted, those provisions would assist in resolving
future hold outs, should hold outs remain a persistent problem
in the future.
When an arbitration provision has been adopted into a
league’s CBA by a professional sports league and the players’
union, the parties agree in advance that any dispute between
them that arises under the CBA will be submitted to an
arbitrator instead of a court.113 Hence, both parties relinquish
their rights to resort to the courts.114 Arbitration has become the
dispute resolution process of choice within the professional
sports industry because it is more informal, more expedient,
allows for confidentiality of decisions, allows for input from both
parties as to who will hear the case, and is less expensive than
other forms of dispute resolution.115 The arbitration process is
typically initiated when a player or the union notifies the club
that they have a grievance against it.116 The term “grievance” is
generally limited—either in practice or by contractual
definition—to complaints involving conditions or conduct
alleged to violate the contract.117 Under the typical grievance
procedure, complaints unresolved at the first stage progress up
through various levels of management and union
representatives.118 The final step of the grievance procedure is
typically arbitration, meaning a resolution of the dispute by an
impartial third party.119 When arbitration is binding, the
decision is final, can be enforced by a court, and can only be
112 E. Coast Hockey League v. Prof’l Hockey Players Ass’n, 322 F.3d 311,
314 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 648 (1986)).
113 JAMES T. GRAY, 1 SPORTS L. PRAC. § 1.09(1)(a) (citing J. WEISTART & C.
LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 408 (1979)).
114 GRAY, supra note 113, at § 1.09(1)(a).
115 Id. at § 1.09(1)(b) (citing WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 113, at 410).
116 Id. at § 1.09(2)(a).
117 Id. at § 1.09(2)(b).
118 Id.
119 Id.
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appealed on very narrow grounds.120 Each of the four main
sports already has binding arbitration provisions in its CBA.121
Since arbitration disputes in professional sports arise from
grievances between professional athletes and the franchises who
owns the athletes’ playing rights,122 the disputes pertaining to
the players’ contracts to play implicate labor law. Under labor
law, the players have the right to unionize under the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).123 Section VI of the NLRA
recognizes that each professional players’ union has: (1) the
right to self- organization; (2) the right to bargain collectively
through representatives of the employees’ own choosing; and (3)
the right to engage in concerted activities for employees’ mutual
aid or protection.124 Each professional sports league has its own
players’ union: the Major League Baseball Players’ Association
(“MLBPA”) for the MLB; the National Basketball Players’
Association (“NBPA”) for the NBA; the National Football League
Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) for the NFL; and the National
Hockey League Players’ Association (“NHLPA”) for the NHL.125
Though there are provisions regarding arbitration in each major
professional sports league’s CBA, most of the salary disputes
that go to arbitration occur when a player is without a contract,
not when the player has a contract which the player does not
deem reflective of his true value.126 For example, in the MLB
and NHL, there is a period in each player’s career where each
player is “arbitration eligible,” meaning that the player must go
to arbitration with his team to resolve what the player’s salary
will be for the upcoming season. 127 There are currently no
provisions in any professional sports league’s CBA pertaining to
how a league will handle a player hold out. Only one of the four
See GRAY, supra note 113, at § 1.09.
See MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Art. VI(E); NBA CBA, supra note 20,
at Art. XXXI, XXXII; NFL CBA, supra note 20, at Art. 9(4), 26(4), 41(3), 43(6),
44(7); NHL CBA, supra note 19, at Art. 17.5.
122 GRAY, supra note 113, at § 1.09(3)(a).
123 Id. at § 1.09(3)(b)(ii).
124 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
125 See generally MLB CBA, supra note 21; NBA CBA, supra note 20; NFL
CBA, supra note 20; NHL CBA, supra note 19.
126 See MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Art. XX(B)(1); NBA CBA, supra note
20, at Art. XI, § 5(p); NFL CBA, supra note 20, at Art. 9(4); NHL CBA, supra
note 19, at Art. 12.
127 See MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Art. VI(E)(1); NHL CBA, supra note
19, at Art. 12.
120
121
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major sports leagues, the NFL, even refers to a “hold out” (the
process itself) or a “holdout” (the player conducting the hold out)
in its most recent CBA.128 So while there are provisions which
pertain to determining a player’s salary, those arbitration
provisions apply only after the previous contract has expired—
not when a player disputes the amount of his salary.
A major hurdle to incorporating into the CBA a provision
which calls for binding arbitration when a player holds out is
that professional athletes do not like going to arbitration. For
example, in early 2017, the New York Yankees of the MLB
completed arbitration proceedings with star relief pitcher Dellin
Betances.129 A relief pitcher is any pitcher who pitches in any
inning—other than the ninth inning—after the starting pitcher
leaves the game. Closing pitchers, on the other hand, are
normally the pitchers pitching in the ninth inning with the
hopes that the pitcher will close out a win for his team.
Betances, though he was not a closing pitcher, believed he was
entitled to earn five million dollars—which is normally a closing
pitcher’s salary—in the upcoming 2017 season. Betances
believed his value as a relief pitcher was akin to the value of
what a closing pitcher would normally be. The Yankees, on the
other hand, believed Betances’ services were worth only three
million dollars, which is on the higher-end of relief pitcher
salaries.130
After a tumultuous arbitration process, the
arbitrator ruled that Betances would be paid three million
dollars for the 2017 season, thereby adopting the Yankees’

128 See sources cited supra note 126. But see NFL CBA, supra note 20, at
Art. 4(9)(a) (stating that a player commits Forfeitable Breach (i.e., the player
forfeits a portion of the salary the player would otherwise be entitled to) when
the player holds out from, or refuses to participate in practices or games). See
also Art. 43 §§ 1, 6, 7 (stating that arbitration is to be conducted when there is
a grievance “involving the interpretation of, application of, or compliance with,
any provision of this Agreement, the NFL Player Contract, the Practice Squad
Player Contract, or any applicable provision of the NFL Constitution and
Bylaws or NFL Rules pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment of
NFL players,” making it possible that player hold outs could be included as an
arbitrable issue under the auspice of “interpretation of . . . the NFL Player
Contract”).
129 Billy Witz, Yankees’ Dellin Betances Loses in Arbitration, and a War
of
Words
Begins,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
18,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/sports/baseball/yankees-dellin-betancesarbitration-.html.
130 Id.
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salary request.131 After the arbitrator made his ruling, Yankees
President Randy Levine told the media that Betances earned the
correct salary because Betances was not a closing pitcher.132
Levine stated, “[i]t’s like me saying, ‘I’m not the president of the
Yankees; I’m an astronaut.’ No, I’m not an astronaut, and Dellin
Betances is not a [closing pitcher].”133 Levine’s comments,
combined with the arbitration process, made Betances upset.
Betances said, “[t]hey take me in a room, and they trash me for
about an hour and a half. I thought it was unfair for me. I feel
like I’ve done a lot for this organization.”134 Betances’ 2017
plight shed light on the divisiveness of the arbitration process
and illustrated how arbitrations can lead to negative feelings by
either the organization or the player. Current MLB players are
so arbitration-averse that many star players are signing
contracts with their teams through their arbitration years135 to
avoid the process.136 For these reasons, presenting a provision
that mandates binding arbitration to a player’s union may not
be a popular choice for resolving the labor disputes that arise
when a player holds out.
However, binding arbitration which would end a player’s
hold out is clearly distinguishable from the current salary
arbitrations that take place in professional sports. Though it is
true that binding arbitration to end a hold out and binding
arbitration when a player does not have a contract both
Id.
Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Under the current MLB CBA, the franchise that owns the player’s
playing rights retains six years of arbitration eligibility with that player. MLB
CBA, supra note 21, at Art. XX(B)(1). After the player has accrued six years
or more in MLB service time, the player no longer must submit to binding
arbitration with his franchise and can become a free agent. Id.
136
For examples of notable MLB stars that have signed lucrative
contracts to avoid arbitration, see Katherine Acquavella, Yankees, Luis
Severino Avoid Arbitration With Four-Year, $40 Million Contract Extension,
Reports
Say,
CBS
SPORTS
(Feb.
15,
2019,
12:12
PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/yankees-luis-severino-avoid-arbitrationwith-four-year-40-million-contract-extension-reports-say/; Associated Press,
Blake Snell, Rays Agree to $50 million, 5-Year Contract, WASH. POST (Mar. 21,
2019),
http://stats.washingtonpost.com/mlb/story.asp?i=20190321153630838520708;
Greg Johns, Segura Inks Five-Year Contract Extension, MLB.COM (June 6,
2017),
https://www.mlb.com/news/mariners-sign-jean-segura-to-5-yearextension-c234786126.
131
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necessarily involve the possibility of a player earning a new
salary, binding arbitration that ends a hold out would end the
labor dispute over a current contract that the player has with
the franchise and permit the player to play with his team again.
This would make arbitration important—and potentially even
necessary—when the player holding out is doing so as the new
season approaches because arbitration would be the most
expedient way of resolving the player’s salary dispute. While
the franchise may seek to maintain the position that the player
should abide by the current contract, there is nothing to prevent
the franchise from putting forth such a position in a binding
arbitration proceeding. There is a chance, though, that if the
franchise takes that position, the arbitrator may deem that the
player’s proposed salary is more reflective of the player’s value
at the time of the arbitration. Binding arbitration would
therefore protect both management and the player when a
player holds out. The player would be protected because, if the
player is truly deserving of a pay increase, the arbitrator will
likely side with the player and award the player the salary the
player desires. Conversely, binding arbitration protects the
franchise by giving a player one opportunity to make his case as
to why he is deserving of a higher salary and, if the arbitrator
does not accept the player’s proposal for a salary increase, then
the franchise’s proposal for the player’s salary must be accepted.
Thus, binding arbitration would bring both an expedient end to
the hold out and remedy the player’s material breach.
One of the criticisms to the binding arbitration approach is
that there are no safeguards proposed which would prevent each
player from holding out during a successful season or at the
conclusion of a successful season. The counter argument to the
system proposed above would be that, once a player is achieving
success, he will hold out and demand a higher salary and submit
for binding arbitration. However, additional language can be
added to the binding arbitration provision which would either
limit the frequency at which the players can hold out, by limiting
the number of arbitrations each player is entitled to seek, or
make it mandatory that a player must wait a certain amount of
time before the player can seek binding arbitration again. It is
also worth noting that the arbitrator is not obligated to accept
the player’s proposal when the player goes to binding
arbitration. Both the player and the franchise must make their
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case as to why their side’s salary proposal best reflects the
player’s salary. Therefore, because there are alternatives
available which would prevent potential abuses of the binding
arbitration system, the system remains a viable option for
professional sports leagues to adopt in their CBA. Again, until
the current CBAs for the MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL expire,
none of the leagues can adopt a binding arbitration system.
However, the benefits that both the franchises and the players
stand to gain from such a system being in place to resolve hold
outs would outweigh the current system that essentially leaves
one side, the franchise, without an adequate remedy.
B. “Self-Help Specific Performance”
Another adequate alternative is Professor Johnson’s
suggestion of a “self-help specific performance” remedy, which
he set forth in his article, The Argument for Self-Help Specific
Performance: Opportunistic Renegotiation of Player Contracts.137
The self-help remedy calls for the franchise to agree to the
player’s opportunistic demand for renegotiation and then, after
the player has fully performed, contest the modification and seek
to recover any payments made in excess of those called for under
the original contract.138
For agreements unsupported by
additional consideration, Professor Johnson argues that his
proposal for a self-help remedy would be effective because of the
pre-existing duty rule.139 This rule provides that if the promisor
in a modification did not provide something of additional value,
the modification was not supported by consideration and was
thus invalid.140 In applying the pre-existing duty rule to sports
contracts, any contract where the player essentially forces the
franchise to agree to the contract by leveraging his situation and
threatening to hold out can be challenged by the franchise at a
later time if the contract is not supported by additional
consideration.141
Johnson, supra note 51, at 92.
Id.
139 Id. at 93.
140 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
141 See id. at § 89(a) (stating that “[a] promise modifying a duty under a
contract not fully performed on either side is binding if the modification is fair
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the
137
138
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Though it may be argued that for a franchise to acquiesce to
the holdout’s demand, only to later seek to recover the difference
between the original contract and modified contract, is a breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied for every
contract, this is not necessarily true.
First, and most
importantly, the franchise’s maneuvering in acquiescing to the
holdout’s demand is a direct result of the holdout’s breach of
contract. If the holdout’s breach is deemed to be a material
breach, then, as mentioned earlier, the franchise is permitted to
take steps in response, such as suspending its own
performance.142 Second, for such a contract modification to take
place, there must first be a contract to modify. Even if the first
contract has been breached, the contract may still be modified
because a breach of contract does not necessitate a rescission of
the contract, being that rescission requires both parties to agree
to a discharge of the duties called for in the contract.143 The
importance of there being a contract already in place is
significant because in contesting the assertion that the franchise
agreed to the modification in bad faith, the franchise can counter
that the holdout negotiated in bad faith, because the holdout
either withheld or threatened to withhold his unique skills until
he was able to obtain the modification he desired. With this
being the case, the holdout’s bad faith challenge to the
franchise’s later recourse may be dismissed by a court.
Even if the modified contract was supported by additional
consideration, such as the holdout’s contract getting extended, it
is still possible for franchises to bring an action against the
holdout after the holdout has fully performed through a claim of
economic duress.144 To constitute duress, a manifestation of
assent must be induced by an “improper threat” that leaves the
victim “no reasonable alternative.”145 A threat is improper if it
represents a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.146
Thus, economic duress would render the contract voidable.147 A
successful claim of duress requires a showing of three elements:
contract was made”).
142 See id. at § 237.
143 See id. at § 283(1).
144 Johnson, supra note 51, at 99. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
146 Id. at § 176(1)(d).
147 Johnson, supra note 51, at 99.
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(1) an improper threat; (2) the lack of a reasonable alternative;
and (3) the inadequacy of ordinary remedies for breach.148 When
a player holds out from his contract, the impropriety of the
threat element is met because the “object [of the threat] is to
extort more money from his employer for what is essentially
little more than his already promised performance.”149 Further,
even if the player does not explicitly threaten to breach his
contract, duress can still be inferred from words or other
conduct.150 Therefore, even if the player merely threatens to
hold out, this could be enough for the franchise to bring an
economic duress claim.
Much like the improper threat element, the next two
elements of economic duress are also likely met during a player
holdout. The lack of a reasonable alternative element is likely
met because the type of personal service called for in a sports
contract is the quintessential example of unique performance for
which no true substitute exists, as no one player performs quite
like another.151 In this manner, player contracts, due to their
uniqueness, are akin to the performance contract Johanna
Wagner signed, and later breached, which precipitated Lumley
v. Wagner.152 Similarly, the inadequacy of ordinary remedies
element is met because the only remedy traditionally available
upon breach may be a negative injunction.153 However, the
negative injunction does not provide adequate recompense to the
club because the injunction merely prohibits the player from
playing elsewhere.
This resolution to the hold out dilemma is not without its
obstacles.
With self-help specific performance, Professor
Johnson identifies two main issues franchises may face: (1) the
reluctance of the court to find that a sophisticated, wealthy,
corporate defendant could be the victim of duress by an
individual player; and (2) that the franchise did not affirm the
modification of the player’s contract.154 The first obstacle can be

148
149
150

1981).

151
152
153
154

Id.
Id. at 100.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS § 175, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.

Johnson, supra note 51, at 100–01.
Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 687–99.
See Rapp, supra note 86, at 262.
Johnson, supra note 51, at 100-01.
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overcome, however, through emphasizing the particular
favorable circumstance the player finds himself in or
highlighting the considerable bargaining power of a superstar
player.155 Through this heightened bargaining power, premier
players are typically able to get the contracts they want because
the franchise does not want to risk those players withholding
their services or demanding to play for a different franchise.
Similarly, the second obstacle, the non-affirmance of the
modification, can be overcome by the franchise showing that the
franchise only briefly affirmed the contract and gave in to the
player’s demand until the threat of the player withholding his
services had subsided.156 In other words, the franchise can seek
restitution for the “excess” payments as long as the franchise
“disaffirms the modified contract within a ‘reasonable time.’”157
While the term “reasonable time” is ambiguous, it likely means
that the franchise can bring its economic duress claim against
the player shortly after the time of the holdout’s threat has
subsided.158
A provision necessitating binding arbitration between the
holdout and the franchise would be a topic that would be
worthwhile considering during the next negotiating period for
each league’s CBA because of the expedited—and fair—
resolution process that would take place between the player and
the franchise. However, if the players’ associations and the
leagues are unable to agree to such a provision, the self-help
specific performance remedy may be the best alternative for
franchises to begin to shift the balance of power in professional
athlete contract hold outs.
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Id.
Id.
See id.
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